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"Welcome to the second article in our exclusive series on 'Global Agricultural Chemicals: Production, Trade, and Tariff Impacts.' If you missed the first one, catch up here: Global Market Structure of Agri-Chemicals – Producers, Exporters, and Leading Companies."

Agrochemicals – encompassing fertilizers and pesticides – are traded in enormous quantities worldwide, with dramatic shifts in recent years due to price spikes and geopolitical events. The year 2022 saw a sharp jump in fertilizer import bills globally, followed by a pullback in 2023 as prices eased​. In 2022 the world spent about $153 billion on imported fertilizers, one-third higher than typical levels, before dropping to $101 billion in 2023​. Figure 1 illustrates this trend for key importers: Brazil’s fertilizer import bill nearly doubled from 2021 to 2022 (peaking around $25 billion) and then fell by 41% in 2023, while India and the United States showed similar spike-and-drop patterns​​. This volatility exposed how dependent many countries are on external supplies of critical farm inputs. At the same time, global pesticide use has continued rising steadily, reaching 3.70 million tonnes of active ingredients in 2022 (a 4% increase from 2021)​ – a doubling of agricultural pesticide use since 1990. The surge in agrochemical demand reflects intensifying agriculture in major economies, but it also brings vulnerabilities and prompts questions about sustainability and self-reliance.

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Figure 1: Fertilizer import values for Brazil, India, and the U.S. (2021–2023), illustrating the 2022 price spike and subsequent decline​​.

Top Importers and Consumers of Fertilizers

Synthetic fertilizers (nitrogen, phosphate, potash products) dominate agrochemical trade by volume and value. In 2023, the world’s five biggest fertilizer importers – Brazil, India, the United States, China, and France – accounted for about 43% of global import spending​. Brazil led with $14.6 billion (14.4% of world imports), followed by India ($10.4 billion) and the U.S. ($9.8 billion)​. China and France were next, at $5.6 billion and $2.9 billion respectively. Other major importers in 2023 included Australia, ��ü���쾱���, Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, and Canada, each spending on the order of $2–2.5 billion​. By volume, these rankings are similar – for example, Brazil imported roughly 38 million tonnes of fertilizer products in 2022​, far ahead of most peers, while India’s import volume was on the order of ~20 million tonnes (about 30% of its ~65 Mt fertilizer consumption)​​. China is actually the world’s largest fertilizer consumer (its domestic nutrient use exceeds 50 Mt), but China produces most of its own supply and even exports in some years. India is the second-largest consumer (with 30.6 Mt nutrients used in 2023–24, equivalent to ~64.8 Mt of fertilizer products)​​, and relies on imports for key nutrients. The United States and Brazil are next in fertilizer use (the U.S. accounts for about 10% of global nutrient consumption and Brazil ~8%​). In short, a handful of big agricultural countries drive global fertilizer demand – and those without ample domestic production must import heavily to meet that demand.

Figure 2: Fertilizer import values in 2023 for selected major importers​. Brazil, India, and the U.S. were the top three importers by value, with Brazil alone accounting for about 14% of global fertilizer import spending.

Notably, Brazil, India, and the United States have each been the top importer in certain categories or years. In 2021, Brazil was the single largest fertilizer importer at $16.6 billion, ahead of the U.S. ($10.3 billion) and India ($9.1 billion)​. By 2022, Brazil and India’s import bills ballooned (due to high prices) to nearly $25 billion and $17 billion respectively, before moderating in 2023​​. Other countries like France and Indonesia also saw their fertilizer import costs skyrocket in 2022 (France’s more than doubled to ~$4.8 billion, Indonesia’s to ~$3.7 billion) and then drop by 40-45% in 2023 as prices normalized​. In terms of consumption, China, India, the U.S., and Brazil use the largest volumes of fertilizers to support their agricultural output. However, China and the U.S. have substantial domestic production (China is largely self-sufficient in nitrogen and phosphates, and the U.S. produces most of its nitrogen and some phosphates), whereas India and Brazil rely much more on imports for their needs. This divergence in self-sufficiency is a critical factor in these nations’ economic and food security strategies, as discussed further below.

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Organic and bio-fertilizers remain a tiny fraction of global trade compared to synthetic fertilizers. In 2023, only about 1.1% of international fertilizer trade (by value) was in organic fertilizers of animal or plant origin​. These products (e.g. manure, compost, bone meal) are low-cost bulk materials – they form a larger share by volume but very small by value. Even including emerging biofertilizers (microbial and plant-based nutrient inputs), the market is a drop in the bucket next to conventional fertilizers. The global organic fertilizer market was estimated around $12 billion in 2024, roughly 5–6% of the overall fertilizer market size​. That said, many countries are now actively promoting organic soil amendments and biofertilizers as a supplement or partial substitute for chemical fertilizers (as part of sustainability initiatives), which could gradually increase their share in the coming years.

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Figure 3: Share of global fertilizer import value (2023) by country​. The eight highlighted countries (Brazil, India, United States, France, Indonesia, Thailand, Turkey, Australia) together accounted for about 46% of world fertilizer import spending, reflecting their large agricultural sectors and import dependence.

Top Importers and Consumers of Pesticides

Synthetic pesticides (including herbicides, insecticides, fungicides, etc.) are another major agrochemical input. While pesticide trade values are lower than fertilizers, certain countries stand out as leading importers. Brazil has become the world’s largest importer of agricultural pesticides, reflecting its vast soybean, corn, and sugarcane acreage. In 2022 Brazil imported over $7.1 billion in pesticides​, and in 2023 around $4.9 billion​ (the drop likely due to market adjustments and currency effects). This makes Brazil the top market for agrochemical companies – a position consistent with its status as an agricultural superpower. Other major pesticide importers include France (about $2.4 billion in 2023) and Canada ($2.1 billion), followed by Germany ($1.8 billion) and the United States (~$1.6 billion)​​. Interestingly, India and China – while large pesticide users – are net exporters or largely self-sufficient in pesticide production, so they don’t appear among top importers. For example, China is a leading exporter of many herbicide and insecticide active ingredients, and India’s generic agrochemical industry supplies both domestic needs and export markets. In terms of consumption, China is the biggest pesticide user globally (accounting for a significant portion of the 3.7 Mt used in 2022​), with the U.S. and Brazil also among the top consumers (each using hundreds of thousands of tonnes of active ingredients annually). France and other European countries have lower total usage but high intensity in certain sectors (though the EU has actually managed to slightly reduce pesticide use in recent decades – Europe’s usage in 2022 was ~5% lower than in 1990​ due to stricter regulations).

Biopesticides and organic crop protection are a growing niche, but still form a minor share of overall pesticide use. The global biopesticides market was valued around $8–9 billion in 2024, roughly ~10% of the ~$80+ billion combined pesticide market​​. North America and Europe are leading regions in adopting biopesticides (spurred by regulatory support and consumer demand for lower residues), and some countries have notable usage – for instance, in parts of Oceania, nearly 44% of insecticides used were biopesticides (as observed in certain island nations)​. Still, in the major farming economies, chemical pesticides remain predominant. Many governments have set targets to shift this balance; the EU’s Green Deal, for example, aimed to cut chemical pesticide use/risk by 50% by 2030​. Such policies, if realized, could reduce pesticide imports (and encourage biocontrol alternatives) in regions like Europe, but globally, the pesticide import/consumption rankings continue to be led by countries with large-scale conventional farming systems.

Country Case Studies: Import Dependence & Trends

Brazil

Brazil is a powerhouse of agricultural production – and consequently one of the world’s largest consumers of fertilizers and pesticides. It imports about 85% of its fertilizer requirements​, a heavy dependency that Brazilian policymakers and industry leaders view as a strategic vulnerability. In 2021, Brazil alone accounted for 8% of global fertilizer consumption​ while producing only a small fraction of those inputs domestically. Its imports span all three major nutrients: Brazil imports virtually 95% of its nitrogen fertilizers (largely urea and ammonia, with Russia and China among top suppliers)​, about 75% of its phosphates (from Morocco, Russia, etc.), and 100% of its potash, historically relying on Canada, Russia and Belarus​​. This reliance was put under the microscope in 2022, when sanctions on Belarus and the war in Ukraine raised fears of potash and nitrogen shortages. In fact, roughly 20% of Brazil’s fertilizer imports came from Russia in 2021 (and nearly 30% if Belarus is included)​. Any disruption to those supplies could directly threaten Brazil’s crop yields, with global ramifications given Brazil’s role in soybean, corn, coffee, and sugar markets. Brazilian pesticide use is also enormous – it is estimated Brazil uses 1.8–1.9 Mt of pesticides annually (active ingredient)​, and it leads the world in pesticide import value​, sourcing many chemicals from China and domestic formulators.

Cognizant of these risks, Brazil has launched a National Fertilizer Plan to boost self-sufficiency. Announced in 2022 amid the Ukraine crisis, the plan aims to reduce import dependence from 85% to 45% by 2050​. Key actions include reviving domestic fertilizer production (e.g. reopening nitrogen fertilizer plants – helped by new natural gas market rules – and developing phosphate mining projects in Pará and potash mining in Amazonas)​​. The government is also encouraging alternatives: the plan explicitly promotes greater use of organic fertilizers and improved efficiency of fertilizer application​. Brazil’s agricultural research agency Embrapa is working with farmers to optimize fertilizer use (e.g. leveraging residual soil nutrients), a campaign expected to cut fertilizer demand by 20% in the 2022/23 season without significant yield loss​. In the private sector, major fertilizer firms (Yara, Mosaic, etc.) have indicated willingness to invest in local production if regulatory conditions improve​​. These efforts underscore Brazil’s determination to turn its fertilizer vulnerability into an opportunity – by developing its vast untapped nutrient resources (Brazil has significant phosphate rock reserves and some potash deposits) and adopting sustainable practices. Still, in the short term Brazil remains highly exposed to global fertilizer markets. For example, Brazil’s fertilizer import bill in 2022 hit a record $26–27 billion (up ~50% from 2021) before easing to $14.6 billion in 2023​​, illustrating how global price swings directly impact Brazilian agriculture. Reducing this exposure is now a matter of national food security policy.

India

India is another agrarian giant with intensive agrochemical use, but unlike Brazil, India has a substantial domestic fertilizer industry – especially for nitrogen. India is the world’s second-largest fertilizer consumer (after China) and in 2023/24 used about 30.6 Mt of N-P-K nutrients​ (over 64 million tonnes of fertilizer products). Thanks to decades of investment, India today produces the majority of its own urea (nitrogen) needs; however, it remains import-dependent for phosphates and potash. Overall, India still must import roughly 25–30% of its total fertilizer requirements in a typical year​. Notably, 100% of India’s potash (Muriate of Potash, MOP) is imported, since India has no domestic K deposits​. Phosphate (DAP, phosphoric acid) is partially imported or made from imported rock. Even for urea, India has sometimes imported 5–7 million tonnes annually to close the gap​. This import reliance carries financial and strategic risks: the government’s fertilizer subsidy bills balloon when global prices rise (India spent a record ₹2.25 trillion (~$27 billion) on fertilizer subsidies in FY2022-23 to shield farmers from high prices​). Geopolitically, India must maintain good relations with fertilizer-exporting nations (it sources urea from the Middle East and potash from countries like Canada, Israel, Belarus and Russia). In 2022, Indian importers opportunistically bought large volumes of discounted Russian fertilizer, helping offset shortages elsewhere but increasing reliance on one supplier.

To mitigate these risks, India has pursued a dual strategy: expand domestic production capacity and diversify import sources. On the domestic front, India is aggressively ramping up urea production. The government announced it will end urea imports by 2025 by bringing online five new urea plants (in Uttar Pradesh, Telangana, Odisha, Bihar, and Jharkhand) with a combined 6.5 Mt/year output​​. Additionally, India is pioneering nano-urea (a concentrated liquid urea fertilizer) produced by the domestic firm IFFCO, aiming for 5 Mt/year of equivalent nutrient by 2025​. These innovations could dramatically cut the need for imported urea. For phosphates, India has acquired stakes in overseas mines (for example in Jordan, Tunisia) and secures long-term supply contracts for phosphoric acid. To address the potash dependence, India has been signing deals with multiple suppliers (Canada, Belarus, Russia, Israel) and even exploring domestic potash extraction from brine in Gujarat. The strategic diversification paid off in 2022–23: when Belarusian and Russian potash faced sanctions, India increased purchases from Canada and even turned to countries like Jordan and Germany for specialty potash, ensuring no shortfall in Indian fields. India also maintains large fertilizer stockpiles through its state trading companies as a buffer. On the demand side, India promotes balanced nutrient use and organic alternatives (for instance, encouraging composting, biofertilizers, and crop rotation through programs like Paramparagat Krishi Vikas Yojana for organic farming). However, given the imperatives of food security for 1.4 billion people, India’s use of synthetic fertilizers remains high. The country’s policy emphasis is on self-reliance (“Atmanirbhar Bharat” in fertilizers) rather than reducing total agrochemical use. If India meets its 2025 self-sufficiency target for urea​, it would mark a historic shift, potentially making India more insulated from global fertilizer shocks – though potash and phosphate will continue to be its import Achilles’ heel.

United States

The United States is a major agrochemical consumer as well, but it differs from India and Brazil in that it has significant domestic production and a more balanced import portfolio. The U.S. is the world’s third-largest fertilizer importer by value​ (spending ~$9.8 billion in 2023 on imports) and also among the top consumers (about 10% of global fertilizer nutrients)​. However, the U.S. has a “robust fertilizer industry” of its own​, especially in nitrogen fertilizers. Abundant natural gas has long fueled American ammonia-urea plants (concentrated in Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas)​, and phosphate rock is mined in Florida and North Carolina. As a result, the U.S. meets most of its nitrogen (~87%) and phosphate (~91%) needs domestically​. The one nutrient where the U.S. is highly import-dependent is potash (potassium) – the U.S. lacks sizable potash ore reserves. The country imports about 93% of its potash demand, with the vast majority coming from neighboring Canada (which supplies 83% of U.S. potash)​. Russia and Belarus together supplied around 12% of U.S. potash in 2021​, a share that has likely declined due to sanctions. This heavy reliance on Canada is strategically low-risk (Canada is a stable ally and the world’s largest potash producer), but it still means U.S. farmers depend on foreign supply for a key nutrient. For nitrogen, while the U.S. produces most of what it uses, it still imports some nitrogen products – often in the form of ammonia or urea from Trinidad & Tobago, Canada, and others – roughly 12.5% of U.S. nitrogen consumption is imported​. Likewise, about 9% of phosphates used are imported (largely finished fertilizers or phosphoric acid)​. The U.S. also imports a significant volume of formulated pesticides, even though it has domestic pesticide manufacturing by multinationals like Corteva and FMC. In 2022 the U.S. imported about $2.1 billion worth of pesticides​ indicating integration with global agrochemical supply chains (notably, many generic herbicides and fungicides are sourced from China or India).

The strategic risks for the U.S. are somewhat different: less about availability (given Canada as a reliable fertilizer source) and more about price and concentration. The 2022 fertilizer price shock hit American farmers via higher costs even though physical supply was sufficient. This has driven U.S. policy moves to enhance resilience and competition. In 2022, the U.S. Department of Agriculture rolled out a $500 million Fertilizer Production Expansion Program to spur new domestic fertilizer capacity​. Grants have been awarded to projects across 12 states to boost production of crop nutrients and innovative fertilizers, aiming to reduce farmers’ exposure to import price swings​. There is also attention to transportation and tariffs – for example, the U.S. investigated fertilizer import tariffs that might have inadvertently reduced import competition, and worked to keep trade with Canada and others flowing. On the pesticide side, U.S. regulators are tightening scrutiny on certain imports (e.g. banning some Chinese-made insecticides due to safety concerns), but generally the U.S. benefits from a diversified set of suppliers and strong domestic companies. In summary, the U.S. has a much lower import dependency ratio for agrochemicals than countries like Brazil or India, yet it remains intertwined with global markets. Its priority is ensuring those global linkages do not translate into supply disruptions or anti-competitive pricing. By leveraging domestic natural resources (gas for nitrogen, phosphate rock) and the friendly partnership with Canada for potash, the U.S. has so far maintained good supply security – though at the cost of still being impacted by worldwide price volatility.

France (and the EU)

France is highlighted both as a major importer and a case of a developed economy trying to reduce agrochemical reliance. As the largest agricultural producer in the EU, France is a significant consumer of fertilizers and pesticides – and a net importer of both. In 2023, France’s fertilizer imports were valued around $2.9 billion​ (putting it 5th globally by import value), roughly the same as in 2021​ after a spike in 2022 (when costs exceeded $4.7 billion)​. France relies on imports particularly for potash (Europe has no indigenous potash except small operations in Germany) and for nitrogen fertilizers when domestic production falls short. Indeed, Europe’s natural gas crisis in 2021–2022 severely impacted EU fertilizer production – 70% of EU ammonia capacity shut down in late 2021 as gas prices soared​. By early 2023, 40–50% of EU ammonia plants were still offline, including some permanent closures (BASF in Germany closed an ammonia unit in 2023)​. This meant countries like France had to import more nitrogen fertilizer from abroad (including from Russia, paradoxically). In fact, while the EU worked to decouple from Russian pipeline gas, its fertilizer imports from Russia actually increased – by late 2023, EU imports of Russian fertilizer were up 117% compared to pre-war, effectively importing Russian gas in fertilizer form​. France, along with other EU states, thus faces a strategic conundrum: how to ensure fertilizer supply without undermining climate goals or security. The EU is now pushing measures to boost domestic, low-carbon fertilizer production (using green ammonia from renewables) and to prevent over-reliance on Russian inputs​. France is supportive of these moves as it has the industrial base to produce fertilizer (companies like Yara and Borealis operate in France) if given competitive gas or green hydrogen supplies.

On the pesticide side, France is notable for its high-profile efforts to reduce use. It was for a time the EU’s top pesticide consumer (especially in vineyard fungicides), and it remains a major importer (importing ~$2.4 billion in 2023, the second-largest globally)​. However, France has banned or restricted many chemicals (e.g. neonicotinoids, atrazine) and strongly advocates for organic farming – aiming for 25% of its farmland to be organic by 2030, in line with EU targets. This policy stance, while laudable for sustainability, could increase short-term costs and require careful management of crop yields. France’s situation highlights the tension between reducing agrochemical dependency for environmental reasons and ensuring sufficient supply for farmers. In the near term, France will continue to import substantial fertilizer (particularly from North Africa for phosphates and from Canada for potash) to meet demand, but over the longer term its goals are to cut usage (via agroecology and precision farming) and to source more sustainably (including potentially “greener” fertilizers produced with low emissions). The rest of the EU shares these goals and is also implementing a new Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) which will eventually put a carbon price on imported. This could favor domestic EU fertilizer production (if low-carbon) and diversify import sources away from high-emissions producers. For now, though, France and Europe at large learned in 2022 that dependency on global fertilizer markets can turn into a serious vulnerability, with both economic and geopolitical ramifications.

Indonesia

Indonesia is a major agricultural country (notably in palm oil, rice, and rubber) and accordingly a large agrochemical consumer. It is among the top fertilizer importers, ranking 10th by value in 2023 with about $2.0 billion spent (down from $3.7 billion in 2022’s price spike). Indonesia’s situation is somewhat unique: it has some domestic fertilizer production capacity – primarily nitrogen fertilizer plants run by state-owned PT Pupuk Indonesia – yet it still imports significant volumes of fertilizer, especially potash and phosphate which it cannot produce. Indonesia produces urea domestically (benefiting from natural gas resources in Sumatra and Java) and often has been an exporter of urea in years when local supply exceeds demand. However, domestic urea output has faced challenges due to gas supply constraints and maintenance issues, sometimes leading Indonesia to import urea as well to meet farmer needs. The government provides large subsidies to ensure fertilizers (specifically urea and NPK blends) are affordable for small farmers​ – in 2022, the fertilizer subsidy budget exceeded IDR 25 trillion ($1.7 billion)​. Despite these subsidies, shortages have occurred periodically, indicating supply chain and distribution issues. In terms of import composition, potash (KCl) is a major import (sourced from Canada, Belarus, and Laos, among others), as is phosphate (often imported as finished DAP or as phosphoric acid) from countries like China and Morocco. Indonesia’s palm oil plantations also require large amounts of potassium and phosphate, driving import demand. On the pesticide front, Indonesia imports most of its chemical pesticides (some are formulated locally, but technical grade ingredients come largely from China and India). The tropical climate and year-round cultivation mean high pesticide usage for crops like rice and fruits.

Indonesia’s strategic approach has been to support domestic fertilizer industry modernization while also securing imports through bilateral deals. Recently, the government emphasized the importance of stable natural gas prices for fertilizer plants to keep domestic production viable​. Policies like the Domestic Market Obligation (DMO) for gas have been used to allocate cheaper gas to urea plants, enabling them to produce at lower cost​. Even so, domestic production falls short of total demand (particularly for P and K nutrients), and thus Indonesia’s fertilizer imports are projected to continue growing (~3% CAGR) over the next decade. To diversify supply, Indonesia has explored partnerships – for example, with Canada to ensure potash shipments and with Jordan or Morocco for phosphates. There have also been discussions about Indonesia investing in foreign fertilizer assets (similar to what India and China have done) to gain more control over supply. Additionally, Indonesia is encouraging the use of organik fertilizer (organic) at the village level to reduce reliance on chemicals; some palm oil companies have started turning palm biomass waste into organic fertilizer for their plantations. However, given the scale of intensification needed for staple crops like rice and corn (to meet food self-sufficiency goals), Indonesia will likely remain a significant importer of synthetic fertilizers. Its near-equatorial weather means nutrients leach quickly from soils, necessitating continual fertilizer application – a challenge that keeps Indonesia tied to global fertilizer trade for the foreseeable future.

Thailand

Thailand, known for its large rice, rubber, and cassava production, is another case of a country with high fertilizer import dependence despite some domestic capacity. Thailand imported about $2.27 billion in fertilizers in 2023​ placing it among the top ten importers by value. What’s striking is that Thailand produces only a small fraction of the fertilizers it uses – World Bank data show Thailand’s fertilizer consumption is over 1500% of its domestic production, meaning it must import the vast bulk (over 90%) of its fertilizers. Like Indonesia, Thailand has natural gas (in the Gulf of Thailand) and once had a significant urea production facility (the Nongyai plant), but domestic output has not kept up with growing demand. Thailand relies heavily on imported urea and DAP for its crops. Its top fertilizer import sources in 2022 included Saudi Arabia, China, Russia, Canada, and Malaysia​ – a diverse mix of suppliers for nitrogen and potash. The spike in global prices in 2021–2022 hit Thai farmers hard, leading the government to intervene with subsidies and stock management. For pesticides, Thailand has been noted as a high user (especially herbicides in rice paddies and paraquat, which was controversially used until a recent ban). It imports most pesticides from China and India.

Recognizing the risks, Thailand has been making contingency plans. In late 2022, when high prices threatened farmers’ planting, Thai importers front-loaded urea imports (July 2022 imports doubled year-on-year) to build inventory and stabilize prices​. The government has also reduced import tariffs on fertilizers to zero to lower costs. There is interest in joint ventures with producers in the Middle East for assured urea supply, and with Belarus or Laos for potash (Laos is developing potash mines next door). On the consumption side, Thailand promotes “smart farming” techniques to optimize fertilizer use (since excessive use has been an issue in some areas). It’s also one of the countries researching biofertilizers (for example, using nitrogen-fixing bacteria for rice). Nonetheless, given that Thailand has minimal raw material for P and K fertilizers, it will remain reliant on imports. The strategic focus is thus on managing import sources – keeping a wide supplier base so no single export country disruption can derail Thai agriculture. The case of Thailand underscores that even mid-sized countries with robust agriculture but limited resource endowment face import dependence similar to larger nations, and they too must grapple with price and supply risks in the agrochemical market.

Turkey (��ü���쾱���)

Turkey has a sizable agricultural sector (producing everything from wheat and hazelnuts to fruits and cotton), and it depends on imported agrochemicals to sustain this output. In 2023, ��ü���쾱���’s fertilizer imports were $2.37 billion​ (9th highest globally). Turkey does have some fertilizer production – notably a few nitrogen fertilizer plants and phosphate fertilizer facilities operated by companies like Gübretaş and Eti – but it still imports a large portion of its needs, especially potash and some high-analysis NPK fertilizers. Turkey’s geographic position has made it an importer of fertilizer from the Black Sea region (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus) as well as from the Middle East. In fact, Turkey increased imports of discounted Russian fertilizers in 2022–2023, leveraging its neutral stance regarding sanctions. This gave Turkish farmers access to somewhat cheaper nutrients but also tied Turkey closer to a single source. Domestically, Turkey produces ammonia/urea based on natural gas (though high global gas prices have at times constrained output) and produces some phosphates using imported phosphate rock. Turkey’s fertilizer use is growing as it intensifies crop production and seeks to boost yields, which has kept import demand strong. On the pesticide front, Turkey is a noteworthy case: it has some local agrochemical formulation capacity and even exports certain pesticides to neighboring countries, yet it imports most active ingredients and many finished products from Europe, China, and India.

Turkey’s main risk in agrochemicals comes from currency volatility and supply concentration. The Turkish lira’s weakness in recent years made fertilizer imports extremely expensive domestically, prompting government support. In 2022, fertilizer prices in Turkey nearly doubled in local currency, hurting farmers and leading the government to increase fertilizer subsidies and temporarily cut VAT on fertilizers. Strategically, Turkey is trying to expand domestic fertilizer production to buffer against such shocks. There are plans to increase capacity of existing plants and discussions to exploit Turkey’s boron reserves for making boron-enriched fertilizers (Turkey is rich in boron minerals). Turkey also eyes opportunities in the region – for instance, investing in fertilizer production in Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan and then importing from there. Another diversification effort is greater import from North Africa (e.g. phosphates from Morocco, nitrogen from Egypt) to reduce reliance on any single route. Politically, Turkey’s unique positioning means it can trade both with Western suppliers and sanctioned ones; in 2023, it became a key transit and blending hub for Russian fertilizers entering global markets. While this can ensure availability, it carries reputational and possibly legal risks under changing sanction regimes. In summary, Turkey exemplifies a country working to maintain agricultural productivity amid economic turbulence and shifting trade alliances. By boosting domestic production where possible and smartly sourcing imports, Turkey aims to manage the economic risks of agrochemical dependency. However, its near-total reliance on imported potash and the high import share of phosphates remain challenges that Turkish agriculture will continue to face.

Australia

Australia, with its large-scale grain, cotton, and sugar farming, rounds out our case studies as a developed economy heavily dependent on imported agrochemicals. In 2023 Australia imported about $2.39 billion in fertilizers (8th largest globally). Historically, Australia produced some of its fertilizers – it had ammonia-urea plants (e.g. Incitec Pivot’s Gibson Island plant in Queensland) and phosphate fertilizer production (using locally mined phosphate rock from Christmas Island and elsewhere). Over time, however, many of these operations have closed due to high costs. In fact, at the end of 2022 Incitec Pivot shut down its last urea manufacturing plant (Gibson Island) after gas feedstock contracts expired. Similarly, an Australian phosphate plant producing single superphosphate (SSP) was closed in 2023​. These closures mean Australia now must import essentially all of its urea, DAP, MAP, MOP, and other fertilizers to meet farm demand. The country sources fertilizers from a variety of origins: urea from the Middle East and Southeast Asia, DAP/MAP largely from Morocco, phosphoric acid from Asia, and potash from Canada. Fertilizer is critical for Australia’s high-yield wheat and canola cropping in the south and for pasture improvement in ranchlands. In pesticides, Australia imports most of its needs (valued in the hundreds of millions of USD) since it has no large domestic agrochemical manufacturing; the major suppliers are companies like Nufarm (which itself imports raw ingredients) and multinationals selling into Australia.

Australia’s reliance on imports for fertilizers carries strategic risks similar to other countries, compounded by its remote location. Supply chain disruptions (like shipping delays) or sudden export bans by source countries can leave Australian farmers in a bind. Australia got a scare during the 2021–2022 fertilizer crunch, as prices of urea and DAP hit record highs; farmers had to pay steep prices, and some reduced application rates. Learning from this, Australia is now investigating alternative fertilizer sources and technologies. One notable area is green ammonia – Australia, with its vast renewable energy potential, is exploring producing green ammonia for export and domestic use as fertilizer. There are pilot projects in Western Australia aiming to produce ammonia from solar/wind-powered electrolysis. If successful, these could supply local farms and offset some imports in the long run. In the meantime, the Australian government and industry have taken steps like increasing stockholding (to have a reserve of fertilizers domestically) and engaging diplomatically with key exporters. For example, Australia has discussed fertilizer trade cooperation with Indonesia and Malaysia within ASEAN contexts, since those neighbors produce some excess urea. Additionally, Australia promotes soil health programs (like encouraging nitrogen-fixing legumes in crop rotations and soil testing) to use fertilizers more efficiently, thereby reducing total import needs. Nonetheless, with no domestic potash or urea currently produced, Australia’s situation is one of near-complete import dependence. Its geography (far from many suppliers) makes freight a big part of cost. On the positive side, being a stable, OECD economy, Australia can generally afford needed imports and is an attractive market for exporters. The key challenge will be balancing cost, reliability, and potential future self-production (via tech like green ammonia) to ensure Australian agriculture remains competitive and resilient in the face of global input fluctuations.

Synthetic vs. Organic Agrochemical Trends

Across all these cases, one theme is clear: synthetic fertilizers and pesticides remain the backbone of modern agriculture, but there is growing interest in organic and biological alternatives. In the early 2020s, this interest has translated into policy goals and modest market shifts, though on a global scale the numbers are still small. For instance, several countries (Brazil, India, China) have launched programs to incorporate biofertilizers – such as rhizobium inoculants, phosphorus-solubilizing bacteria, or seaweed extracts – alongside conventional fertilizers. India’s aforementioned “nano urea” is essentially a high-tech biofertilizer designed to improve nitrogen uptake efficiency. Brazil’s National Fertilizer Plan includes incentives to increase the share of organic fertilizers in use​ leveraging its large livestock industry’s manure and compost. In Europe, the Farm to Fork strategy not only aims to cut chemical pesticide use by 50%, but also to expand organic farming to 25% of land by 2030, which would naturally increase use of organic inputs in place of synthetics. Likewise, biopesticides (derived from natural organisms or substances) are being promoted to reduce chemical load – the EU and US have streamlined approvals for microbial pesticides, and countries like France have banned several synthetic pesticides, effectively forcing a switch to alternatives or non-chemical methods.

That said, the current reality is that organic/biological products complement rather than replace synthetics on the whole. The global fertilizer trade data shows animal/plant-based fertilizers were just 1.1% of trade value in 2023​. The global pesticides market is still dominated by synthetic chemicals (biopesticides comprise roughly 10–15% by value). One promising trend is the integration of organic practices to reduce synthetic dependency – for example, integrated pest management (IPM) uses biocontrol agents to cut down on insecticide spraying, and integrated soil fertility management uses crop rotation, manure, and biofertilizers to lower chemical fertilizer requirements. Countries like Indonesia and Thailand encourage using organic matter (rice straw, palm oil mill waste) as fertilizer in fields. Turkey has a program to increase use of farmyard manure and compost, aiming to reduce chemical fertilizer use by a few percent annually. In the business realm, major agrochemical companies are investing in bio-solutions (e.g. Bayer and Syngenta have biopesticide lines now) indicating a recognition of this pivot. But in the timeframe of 2021–2024, these organic solutions are still in an early growth phase. The balance is gradually shifting, driven by both policy (regulations, subsidies for organic) and market forces (organic crop premiums, consumer preferences), yet for the near term synthetic fertilizers and pesticides remain indispensable for achieving necessary crop yields. The challenge ahead is scaling up organic inputs and agroecological methods so that countries can meet fertility and crop protection needs with less imported chemical input – thereby addressing both environmental sustainability and import dependency concerns.

Strategic and Economic Risks of Import Dependency

The experiences of 2021–2024 have underscored the strategic risks for countries that depend heavily on imported agrochemicals. Chief among these risks is price volatility: when global fertilizer prices spiked to all-time highs in 2022 (with urea and potash prices more than doubling from a year earlier), import-dependent nations were squeezed. Many developing countries simply couldn’t afford to import adequate fertilizer at those prices, leading to lower usage, reduced harvests, and heightened food insecurity concerns. An IFPRI analysis noted that the 2022 price spike exposed the vulnerability of import-dependent countries to trade shocks. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, which import most of their fertilizers, had to cut application rates, exacerbating hunger and causing governments to scramble for emergency subsidies. Even wealthier nations like Brazil and India faced budgetary strain from having to pay 2–3 times more for the same fertilizer volumes. This volatility also complicates planning for farmers and agribusinesses, as input costs swing unpredictably.

Another risk is geopolitical supply disruption. Fertilizer and pesticide supplies can be suddenly choked off by events like wars, sanctions, or export restrictions. The Russia-Ukraine war and sanctions on Belarus (both major fertilizer exporters) were a prime example – suddenly a huge share of global potash and ammonia trade was in question. Countries like Brazil and Turkey that counted on those sources had to urgently find alternatives or face shortfalls. Similarly, China imposed temporary export restrictions on fertilizers in late 2021 to protect its domestic supply, which removed a large volume from the world market and drove prices further up​. Import-reliant countries are at the mercy of such decisions by exporting nations. We also saw logistical vulnerabilities: for instance, in late 2023, the Israel-Hamas conflict led to security incidents on the Red Sea shipping route – one fertilizer-laden cargo ship was even attacked and sunk​ illustrating that regional conflicts can threaten transit of goods far afield. In pesticides, much of the world relies on China and India for key ingredients; if either were to curtail exports (as China has occasionally done for environmental reasons), global pesticide supplies would tighten, and prices would rise.

Beyond supply and price, there are economic and development risks. Heavy import bills can drain a nation’s foreign currency reserves and worsen trade balances. For example, countries like Ethiopia, Zambia, Malawi routinely spend a significant share of their limited import budget on fertilizers​, which can be unsustainable without aid. If currencies devalue (as in Turkey or Argentina), fertilizer becomes prohibitively expensive domestically, hitting farm production and rural incomes. There’s also the risk of over-reliance on a single or few suppliers. If one country provides an outsized portion of imports, any issue with that supplier can precipitate a crisis. The EU realized, for instance, that by depending on Russian gas-based fertilizers it was indirectly financing a hostile regime​ – a national security risk. Similarly, if a country relies on one or two multinational companies for all its agrochemicals, there’s risk in case of corporate decisions or supply chain issues at those companies.

Finally, there are environmental and agronomic risks tied to dependency. Cheap imported fertilizers can encourage inefficient overuse, leading to soil degradation or pollution (as seen in parts of Asia with fertilizer runoff). Likewise, reliance on chemical pesticides can foster pest resistance and harm biodiversity, potentially undermining long-term agricultural sustainability. If global policy moves to penalize high-emission inputs (like carbon-intensive fertilizers), countries importing those could face carbon costs or trade barriers (e.g. the EU’s CBAM will impose costs on fertilizer imports based on carbon footprints). This means import-dependent countries might also become regulation-dependent, needing to adapt to rules set by others (exporters or blocs like the EU). In summary, while importing agrochemicals can be the rational choice for economies with little local production, it comes with multifaceted risks – economic shocks, supply insecurity, geopolitical entanglement, and environmental side-effects – that governments must continuously manage.

Building Resilience: Domestic Production & Diversification

In response to the above risks, countries are adopting various strategies to reduce dependency and enhance resilience in their agrochemical supply. These strategies largely fall into two categories: boosting domestic production (or substitutes) and diversifying import sources.

On the production side, a number of import-reliant nations have launched initiatives to increase local fertilizer manufacturing. We saw earlier how India is investing heavily in new urea plants to eliminate imports by 2025​ Similarly, Brazil’s fertilizer plan calls for revitalizing domestic NPK production – e.g. reopening ammonia plants and tapping phosphate and potash deposits – with the goal of cutting import share to 45% by 2050​. The United States, concerned more with price than physical supply, rolled out grant programs supporting new fertilizer projects (including innovative fertilizers like micronutrient-coated granules and organic fertilizers)​. Even small import-dependent countries in Africa are seeking to build blending facilities or modest production units to have some local supply (for instance, Nigeria built a large urea plant recently; Kenya is exploring a blending plant for custom fertilizer formulations). Producing domestically not only reduces import reliance but also can save foreign exchange and create local jobs – thus it has economic appeal. However, it often requires overcoming cost disadvantages (many countries don’t have cheap gas or mineral deposits, which is why they import in the first place). To address this, some governments provide incentives like tax breaks, subsidized energy, or public-private partnerships for fertilizer plants. Green ammonia production is a notable emerging opportunity: countries like Australia, Chile, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco are investing in green hydrogen projects that could yield ammonia for fertilizers, potentially decentralizing production (as renewable energy is widely available). The IFPRI analysis suggests that expanding such green production could “bring in new producers” and reduce reliance on fossil-fuel-based exporters over time.

In tandem with production, promoting alternatives and efficiency is another pillar. Many countries are effectively trying to “produce” some of their fertilizer needs via better agronomy – i.e., get more crop output per unit of fertilizer. Brazilian Embrapa’s push to optimize usage (reducing waste) is one example​. Precision agriculture – using soil testing, remote sensing, and variable-rate technology to apply fertilizers and pesticides more judiciously – is gaining ground in countries like the U.S., France, and Australia. This can lower overall input needs and thus imports. Crop breeding for nutrient-efficient or pest-resistant varieties is another indirect way to cut agrochemical dependence (e.g. breeding rice that needs less fertilizer or corn that resists insects, reducing pesticide necessity).

The second broad strategy is diversification of import supply. Rather than rely on one or two exporters, countries are expanding their supplier base. Brazil, after 2022, significantly shifted its potash sourcing – increasing imports from Canada and Germany to reduce the share from Russia/Belarus​. India maintains relationships with multiple phosphate and potash providers (from Jordan and Morocco to Canada and Russia), and often floats global tenders that allow a variety of suppliers to win part of the volume. Indonesia and Thailand likewise source from a mix of Middle Eastern, East Asian, and other producers. This way, if one source falters, others can fill in. Some countries engage in government-to-government agreements to guarantee supplies: for example, India has an MoU with Saudi Arabia for assured yearly urea supply, and China (when not restricting exports) has been a long-term supplier to many Asian nations via bilateral deals. Stockpiling is another tactic: countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan try to maintain buffer stocks of key fertilizers (with mixed success due to cost), and China historically stockpiled potash. This can cushion short-term disruptions.

Several countries have also invested abroad to secure supplies at the source. India’s state firms have stakes in foreign phosphate mines and have tried to invest in Russian potash companies. China has investments in phosphate in Africa. These equity stakes or long-term offtake agreements can act as an insurance policy, ensuring those outputs are available to the investing country first. Regional cooperation is being pursued as well: within Latin America, there are talks of fertilizer joint ventures (e.g. between Brazil and Bolivia for gas-based fertilizer). In Africa, the African Development Bank launched an Emergency Fertilizer Financing Mechanism to pool resources and negotiate better terms for imports for multiple countries collectively. Meanwhile, the private sector is not idle – global fertilizer companies (OCP, Yara, Nutrien, etc.) are adjusting logistics to reach customers more reliably, and new players (like fertilizers from Egypt or Uzbekistan) are entering the export market, giving importers more options.

The pursuit of sustainability aligns with resilience too. Reducing overuse of inputs (a sustainability goal) inherently makes a country less vulnerable to import supply issues. The IFPRI report argues that scaling up things like composting, crop rotation, and microbial fertilizers has the dual benefit of reducing emissions and import needs​. Countries such as Sri Lanka learned the hard way that abrupt shifts (it briefly banned chemical fertilizers in 2021, causing a crisis) are dangerous; but gradual integration of organic methods can, over time, trim the required volume of imports without harming output.

In conclusion, while no country can eliminate import dependence overnight (especially for resources like potash that are geographically concentrated), most major importers have taken steps between 2021 and 2024 to fortify their agro-input security. Whether it’s Brazil’s multi-faceted fertilizer plan, India’s capacity build-up, the U.S.’s production grants, or France and the EU’s move toward green production and stricter import standards, the direction is clear: resilience and self-reliance are the new watchwords. These policy and business efforts will shape the agrochemical landscape in the coming years – potentially leading to a more distributed production network, more moderate and stable trade flows, and a gradual shift to smarter and more sustainable use of inputs. For businesses, this means new investment opportunities in local production and tech, and for policymakers, it means balancing the immediate need to keep farms supplied with the long-term goal of reducing systemic dependency on external agrochemicals.

Sources: Recent trade and agriculture reports, including FAO and World Bank data on pesticide/fertilizer use trade statistics from ITC/WITS and industry sources for import values​, policy analysis from IFPRI and academic sources highlighting the 2022 shock and responses and news reports (Reuters, etc.) detailing specific national strategies​ These sources provide a comprehensive view of agrochemical import trends, risks, and policy measures in 2021–2024.

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